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Belief: Difference between revisions
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Glover's final message is that if people talk about their beliefs, they may find more deep, relevant, philosophical ways in which they disagree (e.g., less obvious beliefs, or more deeply held beliefs). Glover thinks that people often manage to find agreements and consensus through philosophy. He says that at the very least, if people do not convert each other, they will hold their own beliefs more openmindedly and will be less likely to go to war over conflicting beliefs.<ref name=GloverBeliefs>[http://www.jonathanglover.co.uk/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts'' 'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' '', JonathanGlover.co.uk]</ref><ref name=BitesGlover>[http://philosophybites.com/2011/10/jonathan-glover-on-systems-of-belief.html"Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011]</ref> | Glover's final message is that if people talk about their beliefs, they may find more deep, relevant, philosophical ways in which they disagree (e.g., less obvious beliefs, or more deeply held beliefs). Glover thinks that people often manage to find agreements and consensus through philosophy. He says that at the very least, if people do not convert each other, they will hold their own beliefs more openmindedly and will be less likely to go to war over conflicting beliefs.<ref name=GloverBeliefs>[http://www.jonathanglover.co.uk/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts'' 'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' '', JonathanGlover.co.uk]</ref><ref name=BitesGlover>[http://philosophybites.com/2011/10/jonathan-glover-on-systems-of-belief.html"Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011]</ref> | ||
=== Occurent and Dispositional === | |||
In the [[philosophy]] of empiricism, the term '''dispositional belief''' refers to a [[belief]] that is not currently being considered by the mind, but is stored in memory and is recalled to conclude in occurrent belief. The term '''occurrent belief''' refers to a belief that is currently being considered. It can be contrasted with the concept of dispositional belief. | |||
In the philosophy of rationalism, the term dispositional belief is holding something in one’s attention that may or may not be true, and keeping it there, putting it up for comparison’s sake with all else that is in one’s sphere of attention, to see how it holds up (in German, vorstellen). For a belief to gain strength, and footing, and gradually to approach closer to certainty, it must be consistent and harmonious with whatever else is held in one’s attention. And so there are levels of belief, for a belief starts as an imagination, a conceptualization, an idea. The belief firms up when it becomes an inspiration, you breath it in with enthusiasm, it harmonizes not only with your thoughts, but with your feelings. Of course, for the most part, feelings are dreamily semi-conscious, so to raise a belief to an inspiration, one has to become conscious of one’s feelings, one must be able to attend to one’s feelings, one must be able to hold one’s feelings at the center of attention in a fully conscious way. A person must know his feelings, which is harder than knowing one’s thoughts, as feelings are normally colored by one’s social setting, by, so to speak, one’s prejudices. And finally, belief may reach the level of intuition when it is fully in accord and harmonizes with the entirety of the world of being a human being, which is all that we can know, but for this to happen, it must harmonize, be in accord with one’s willing nature, which is, for the most part, fully unconscious. Willpower, one’s willed directives, intentions, motivations must become fully conscious in order for a belief to become an intuition. Since becoming fully conscious, particularly of the will, is a matter for the distant future, beliefs, by nature, always retain the quality of being less than fully clear. This is why beliefs always have the quality of coloring one’s disposition, mood, demeanor, and are never fully occurrent. And this is in contrast to other pneumatological activity, that is, technique, science, poetry, and recognition. | |||
====Analogy==== | |||
An analogy can be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a computer hardware: What is on its hard disk might be like the dispositional belief, and what is on its screen might be like the occurrent belief. This analogy, however, does not complete the idea of dispositional belief. An analogy can also be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a simple mathematics: You believe the system of numbers, you know the definition of the numbers 2, 3 and 5, and even though you never have heard or seen it before you will understand that the combined value of the numbers 2 and 3 will equal the value of the number 5. Then you have used your occurrent belief of a system of numbers to get dispositional belief to occur to you. (That 2+3=5 is now occurrent belief). | |||
Dispositional beliefs can be formed without ever having been an occurrent belief—for example, if a vehicle passes by whilst a person is engaged in conversation, it may become a dispositional belief that "a vehicle passed by" immediately, as the matter was never consciously considered. To extend the computer analogy, this could be seen as being like downloading files directly to the hard disk without opening them. | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
