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Belief: Difference between revisions
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* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it'' - Known as [[eliminativism]], this view, (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science hasn't provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety. | * ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it'' - Known as [[eliminativism]], this view, (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science hasn't provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety. | ||
* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy'' - The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both [[eliminativism|eliminativists]] in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level. | * ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy'' - The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both [[eliminativism|eliminativists]] in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level. | ||
==Delusional== | |||
[[Delusion]]s are defined as beliefs in [[psychiatric]] diagnostic criteria{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}} (for example in the ''[[Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders]]''). Psychiatrist and historian [[G.E. Berrios]] has challenged the view that delusions are genuine beliefs and instead labels them as "empty speech acts," where affected persons are motivated to express false or bizarre belief statements due to an underlying psychological disturbance. However, the majority of mental health professionals and researchers treat delusions as if they were genuine beliefs. | |||
In [[Lewis Carroll]]'s ''[[Through the Looking-Glass]]'' the [[White Queen (Through the Looking-Glass)|White Queen]] says, "Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast." This is often quoted in mockery of the common ability of people to entertain beliefs contrary to fact. | |||
==Formation== | ==Formation== | ||
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==Modification== | ==Modification== | ||
There are several techniques to change the internal beliefs.<ref> http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1806/180621195006.pdf</ref><ref>http://www.pathwaytohappiness.com/writings_falsebeliefs.htm</ref> | There are several techniques to change the internal beliefs.<ref> http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1806/180621195006.pdf</ref><ref>http://www.pathwaytohappiness.com/writings_falsebeliefs.htm</ref> | ||
==Systems== | ==Systems== | ||
