Belief: Difference between revisions

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* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it'' - Known as [[eliminativism]], this view, (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science hasn't provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it'' - Known as [[eliminativism]], this view, (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science hasn't provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy'' - The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both [[eliminativism|eliminativists]] in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level.
* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy'' - The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both [[eliminativism|eliminativists]] in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level.
==Belief-in==
To "believe in" someone or something is a distinct concept from "believe-that." There are two types of belief-in:<ref>{{cite journal |last=MacIntosh |first=J. J. |year=1994 |url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-15948893/belief-revisited-reply-williams.html |title=Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams |journal=Religious Studies |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=487–503 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500023131 }}</ref>
* '''Commendatory''' - an expression of [[confidence]] in a person or entity, as in, "I believe in his ability to do the job."
* '''Existential claim''' - to claim belief in the existence of an entity or phenomenon with the implied need to justify its claim to existence. It is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. "He believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in Santa Claus" or "I believe in a deity" are typical examples.<ref name="belief-in">{{cite book |last=Macintosh |first=Jack |chapter=Belief-in |title=[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]] |page=86 |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }}</ref>


==Delusional==
==Delusional==
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However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In Anna Rowley's book, Leadership Therapy, she states "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This means that peoples' beliefs should evolve as they gain new experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowley |first=Anna |title=Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft |location=Basingstoke |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2007 |page=69 |isbn=1-4039-8403-4 }}</ref>
However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In Anna Rowley's book, Leadership Therapy, she states "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This means that peoples' beliefs should evolve as they gain new experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowley |first=Anna |title=Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft |location=Basingstoke |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2007 |page=69 |isbn=1-4039-8403-4 }}</ref>
==Belief-in==
To "believe in" someone or something is a distinct concept from "believe-that." There are two types of belief-in:<ref>{{cite journal |last=MacIntosh |first=J. J. |year=1994 |url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-15948893/belief-revisited-reply-williams.html |title=Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams |journal=Religious Studies |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=487–503 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500023131 }}</ref>
* '''Commendatory''' - an expression of [[confidence]] in a person or entity, as in, "I believe in his ability to do the job."
* '''Existential claim''' - to claim belief in the existence of an entity or phenomenon with the implied need to justify its claim to existence. It is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. "He believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in Santa Claus" or "I believe in a deity" are typical examples.<ref name="belief-in">{{cite book |last=Macintosh |first=Jack |chapter=Belief-in |title=[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]] |page=86 |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }}</ref>


==Modification==
==Modification==

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