Belief: Difference between revisions
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{{About|the general concept|other uses|Belief (disambiguation)}} | {{About|the general concept|other uses|:en:Belief (disambiguation)}} | ||
'''[[:en:User:Lycurgus/Belief|Go There]]''' | |||
'''Belief''' is a psychological state in which an individual holds a [[conjecture]] or [[premise]] to be [[truth|true]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Schwitzgebel |first=Eric |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward |contribution=Belief |title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab |location=Stanford, CA |year=2006 |url= http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |accessdate=2008-09-19}}</ref> | '''Belief''' is a psychological state in which an individual holds a [[conjecture]] or [[premise]] to be [[truth|true]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Schwitzgebel |first=Eric |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward |contribution=Belief |title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab |location=Stanford, CA |year=2006 |url= http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |accessdate=2008-09-19}}</ref> | ||
[[Dispositional and occurrent belief]] concerns the contextual activation of the belief into thoughts (reactive of propositions) or ideas (based on the belief's premise). | [[Dispositional and occurrent belief]] concerns the contextual activation of the belief into thoughts (reactive of propositions) or ideas (based on the belief's premise). | ||
==Knowledge and | [[File:certainty.png|thumb]] | ||
==Knowledge and Epistemology== | |||
The terms ''belief'' and ''knowledge'' are used differently in philosophy. | The terms ''belief'' and ''knowledge'' are used differently in philosophy. | ||
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A false belief is not considered to be knowledge, even if it is sincere. A sincere believer in the [[flat earth theory]] does not ''know'' that the Earth is flat.{{citation needed|date=October 2013}} Later epistemologists, for instance [[Edmund Gettier|Gettier]] (1963)<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gettier |first=E. L. |year=1963 |title=Is justified true belief knowledge? |journal=[[Analysis (journal)|Analysis]] |volume=23 |issue=6 |pages=121–123 |doi= |jstor=3326922 }}</ref> and [[Alvin Goldman|Goldman]] (1967),<ref>{{cite journal |last=Goldman |first=A. I. |year=1967 |title=A causal theory of knowing |journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy]] |volume=64 |issue=12 |pages=357–372 |doi= |jstor=2024268 }}</ref> have questioned the "justified true belief" definition. | A false belief is not considered to be knowledge, even if it is sincere. A sincere believer in the [[flat earth theory]] does not ''know'' that the Earth is flat.{{citation needed|date=October 2013}} Later epistemologists, for instance [[Edmund Gettier|Gettier]] (1963)<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gettier |first=E. L. |year=1963 |title=Is justified true belief knowledge? |journal=[[Analysis (journal)|Analysis]] |volume=23 |issue=6 |pages=121–123 |doi= |jstor=3326922 }}</ref> and [[Alvin Goldman|Goldman]] (1967),<ref>{{cite journal |last=Goldman |first=A. I. |year=1967 |title=A causal theory of knowing |journal=[[The Journal of Philosophy]] |volume=64 |issue=12 |pages=357–372 |doi= |jstor=2024268 }}</ref> have questioned the "justified true belief" definition. | ||
==As a psychological | ==As a psychological phenomenon== | ||
Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought. Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis. | Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought. Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis. | ||
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* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it'' - Known as [[eliminativism]], this view, (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science hasn't provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety. | * ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it'' - Known as [[eliminativism]], this view, (most notably proposed by [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]]), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as [[the four humours]] theory of medicine, or the [[phlogiston theory]] of combustion. In these cases science hasn't provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety. | ||
* ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy'' - The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both [[eliminativism|eliminativists]] in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level. | * ''Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy'' - The major proponents of this view, [[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Lynne Rudder Baker]], are both [[eliminativism|eliminativists]] in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett ''the [[intentional stance]]'', belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level. | ||
==Belief-in== | |||
To "believe in" someone or something is a distinct concept from "believe-that." There are two types of belief-in:<ref>{{cite journal |last=MacIntosh |first=J. J. |year=1994 |url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-15948893/belief-revisited-reply-williams.html |title=Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams |journal=Religious Studies |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=487–503 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500023131 }}</ref> | |||
* '''Commendatory''' - an expression of [[confidence]] in a person or entity, as in, "I believe in his ability to do the job." | |||
* '''Existential claim''' - to claim belief in the existence of an entity or phenomenon with the implied need to justify its claim to existence. It is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. "He believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in Santa Claus" or "I believe in a deity" are typical examples.<ref name="belief-in">{{cite book |last=Macintosh |first=Jack |chapter=Belief-in |title=[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]] |page=86 |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }}</ref> | |||
==Delusional== | |||
[[Delusion]]s are defined as beliefs in [[psychiatric]] diagnostic criteria{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}} (for example in the ''[[Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders]]''). Psychiatrist and historian [[G.E. Berrios]] has challenged the view that delusions are genuine beliefs and instead labels them as "empty speech acts," where affected persons are motivated to express false or bizarre belief statements due to an underlying psychological disturbance. However, the majority of mental health professionals and researchers treat delusions as if they were genuine beliefs. | |||
In [[Lewis Carroll]]'s ''[[Through the Looking-Glass]]'' the [[White Queen (Through the Looking-Glass)|White Queen]] says, "Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast." This is often quoted in mockery of the common ability of people to entertain beliefs contrary to fact. | |||
==Formation== | ==Formation== | ||
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However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In Anna Rowley's book, Leadership Therapy, she states "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This means that peoples' beliefs should evolve as they gain new experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowley |first=Anna |title=Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft |location=Basingstoke |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2007 |page=69 |isbn=1-4039-8403-4 }}</ref> | However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In Anna Rowley's book, Leadership Therapy, she states "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This means that peoples' beliefs should evolve as they gain new experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rowley |first=Anna |title=Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft |location=Basingstoke |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2007 |page=69 |isbn=1-4039-8403-4 }}</ref> | ||
==Modification== | |||
==Modification | |||
There are several techniques to change the internal beliefs.<ref> http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1806/180621195006.pdf</ref><ref>http://www.pathwaytohappiness.com/writings_falsebeliefs.htm</ref> | There are several techniques to change the internal beliefs.<ref> http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1806/180621195006.pdf</ref><ref>http://www.pathwaytohappiness.com/writings_falsebeliefs.htm</ref> | ||
==Systems== | ==Systems== | ||
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Glover's final message is that if people talk about their beliefs, they may find more deep, relevant, philosophical ways in which they disagree (e.g., less obvious beliefs, or more deeply held beliefs). Glover thinks that people often manage to find agreements and consensus through philosophy. He says that at the very least, if people do not convert each other, they will hold their own beliefs more openmindedly and will be less likely to go to war over conflicting beliefs.<ref name=GloverBeliefs>[http://www.jonathanglover.co.uk/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts'' 'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' '', JonathanGlover.co.uk]</ref><ref name=BitesGlover>[http://philosophybites.com/2011/10/jonathan-glover-on-systems-of-belief.html"Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011]</ref> | Glover's final message is that if people talk about their beliefs, they may find more deep, relevant, philosophical ways in which they disagree (e.g., less obvious beliefs, or more deeply held beliefs). Glover thinks that people often manage to find agreements and consensus through philosophy. He says that at the very least, if people do not convert each other, they will hold their own beliefs more openmindedly and will be less likely to go to war over conflicting beliefs.<ref name=GloverBeliefs>[http://www.jonathanglover.co.uk/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts/philosophy-beliefs-and-conflicts'' 'Philosophy, Beliefs, and Conflict' '', JonathanGlover.co.uk]</ref><ref name=BitesGlover>[http://philosophybites.com/2011/10/jonathan-glover-on-systems-of-belief.html"Jonathan Glover on systems of belief", Philosophy Bites Podcast, Oct 9 2011]</ref> | ||
=== Occurent and Dispositional === | |||
In the [[philosophy]] of empiricism, the term '''dispositional belief''' refers to a [[belief]] that is not currently being considered by the mind, but is stored in memory and is recalled to conclude in occurrent belief. The term '''occurrent belief''' refers to a belief that is currently being considered. It can be contrasted with the concept of dispositional belief. | |||
In the philosophy of rationalism, the term dispositional belief is holding something in one’s attention that may or may not be true, and keeping it there, putting it up for comparison’s sake with all else that is in one’s sphere of attention, to see how it holds up (in German, vorstellen). For a belief to gain strength, and footing, and gradually to approach closer to certainty, it must be consistent and harmonious with whatever else is held in one’s attention. And so there are levels of belief, for a belief starts as an imagination, a conceptualization, an idea. The belief firms up when it becomes an inspiration, you breath it in with enthusiasm, it harmonizes not only with your thoughts, but with your feelings. Of course, for the most part, feelings are dreamily semi-conscious, so to raise a belief to an inspiration, one has to become conscious of one’s feelings, one must be able to attend to one’s feelings, one must be able to hold one’s feelings at the center of attention in a fully conscious way. A person must know his feelings, which is harder than knowing one’s thoughts, as feelings are normally colored by one’s social setting, by, so to speak, one’s prejudices. And finally, belief may reach the level of intuition when it is fully in accord and harmonizes with the entirety of the world of being a human being, which is all that we can know, but for this to happen, it must harmonize, be in accord with one’s willing nature, which is, for the most part, fully unconscious. Willpower, one’s willed directives, intentions, motivations must become fully conscious in order for a belief to become an intuition. Since becoming fully conscious, particularly of the will, is a matter for the distant future, beliefs, by nature, always retain the quality of being less than fully clear. This is why beliefs always have the quality of coloring one’s disposition, mood, demeanor, and are never fully occurrent. And this is in contrast to other pneumatological activity, that is, technique, science, poetry, and recognition. | |||
====Analogy==== | |||
An analogy can be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a computer hardware: What is on its hard disk might be like the dispositional belief, and what is on its screen might be like the occurrent belief. This analogy, however, does not complete the idea of dispositional belief. An analogy can also be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a simple mathematics: You believe the system of numbers, you know the definition of the numbers 2, 3 and 5, and even though you never have heard or seen it before you will understand that the combined value of the numbers 2 and 3 will equal the value of the number 5. Then you have used your occurrent belief of a system of numbers to get dispositional belief to occur to you. (That 2+3=5 is now occurrent belief). | |||
Dispositional beliefs can be formed without ever having been an occurrent belief—for example, if a vehicle passes by whilst a person is engaged in conversation, it may become a dispositional belief that "a vehicle passed by" immediately, as the matter was never consciously considered. To extend the computer analogy, this could be seen as being like downloading files directly to the hard disk without opening them. | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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==External links== | ==External links== | ||
[[ | [[:en:Belief]] | ||
